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THE MYTHS OF MACPHERSON
John C. P. Goldberg† and Benjamin C. Zipursky††

INTRODUCTION
In 1910, Donald MacPherson bought a new Buick Runabout from Close Brothers, a
dealership in upstate New York. A year later, he was seriously injured when the car veered
off the road as he drove it. MacPherson sued Buick for negligence. His suit alleged that
Buick was careless in marketing a car with a wheel containing a latent defect, which caused
the wheel to crumble and the car to crash. After a verdict for MacPherson was affirmed by
an intermediate appellate court,1 Buick appealed to New York’s high court.
Buick’s hopes for reversal rested mainly on English and New York precedents that
had set limits on the classes of persons to whom manufacturers owed a duty of care. The
most significant of these was Winterbottom v. Wright, decided by the English Exchequer Court
in 1842.2 Wright had contracted with the English Postmaster General to provide a coach for
use in mail delivery along a certain route. The horses and drivers for the coach were
provided to the Postmaster General by a third party named Atkinson. Winterbottom, a
driver hired by Atkinson, was seriously injured when the coach overturned. Winterbottom
sued Wright, claiming that Wright had acted carelessly in providing the Postmaster General
with an unsound coach. The English court rejected Winterbottom’s claim, establishing what
would come to be known as the “privity” rule. Wright’s duty to take care to provide sound
coaches, the court reasoned, was owed only to the Postmaster General. As to downstream
users such as Winterbottom, Wright owed no duty of care.
Other precedents cut against Buick on the duty issue. The New York Court of
Appeals’ 1852 decision in Thomas v. Winchester involved the sale of a bottle containing poison
that had been mislabeled by the manufacturer so as to indicate that it contained medicine.3
†
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The plaintiff ingested the substance—belladonna—only after it was sold to her husband
through intermediaries. Thomas reasoned that mislabeled poisons pose a special kind of
danger, hence a duty was owed to the ultimate consumer notwithstanding the lack of privity
between manufacturer and consumer. Subsequent Court of Appeals decisions declined to
apply the privity rule to various products, including a scaffold erected for the use of workers
in painting a building, a glass bottle containing aerated water, and a large coffee urn.4
In MacPherson, the Court of Appeals ruled 6-1 to affirm the jury’s verdict for the
plaintiff.5 Cardozo’s majority opinion teased out from the precedents a general rule of duty
for manufacturers far broader than Winterbottom’s. Under this rule—which Cardozo deemed
applicable only to products that endanger life or limb, and that are not likely to be inspected
for safety after their initial sale—a manufacturer owes a duty of care to all persons within the
class of persons who would probably be among those injured if the product were carelessly made.
Applying the rule to the facts of the case, Cardozo concluded that Buick owed a duty
of care to MacPherson. Physical harm to an occupant of a mass-manufactured automobile
capable of speeds of 55 miles per hour was a probable outcome of a manufacturer’s careless
failure to ensure its vehicles were free of latent defects in key components. Moreover,
dealers and consumers could not be expected to identify such defects on their own.
Therefore a duty was owed by Buick to such persons, irrespective of privity. Given the jury’s
finding that Buick had breached this duty by failing adequately to test the wheel and had
thereby caused MacPherson to be injured, Buick was liable to MacPherson for negligence.
MacPherson has called forth from judges and academics many of the laudatory
adjectives used to describe important cases: canonical, iconic, and mythical. In this paper we
want to focus on the “mythical.” Regrettably, a good deal of scholarship on MacPherson has
fostered myths about the decision. Three in particular will serve as our focus. The first
concerns the concept of duty in negligence law. The second concerns common law
reasoning. The third concerns the relationship of negligence to strict products liability.
Part I describes the myths, which we expect will be familiar to torts scholars and
other legal academics. Part II identifies what renders each myth mythical and then advances
a better account of duty, judicial reasoning, and the relationship between negligence and
products liability. Part III explains why it is critical that we get over the myths of MacPherson,
explaining the damage they have done to modern tort law, notwithstanding that MacPherson
itself was an engine of commendable change. A century after the fact, it is all the more
important to be clear on what the great case of MacPherson v. Buick actually stands for.
I. MACPHERSON: STANDARD ACCOUNTS
A. Impersonal Duties, Not Relational Duties
As a matter of formal legal doctrine, the issue posed by MacPherson was one of “duty.”
So says Cardozo’s opinion at the outset: “The question to be determined is whether the

4
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defendant owed a duty of care and vigilance to any one but the immediate purchaser.”6
Crucially, this question is framed relationally. It asks whether Buick owed it to someone other
than its dealers to take care to make its cars safe. Implicit in this framing is the possibility
that, for some persons injured by Buick’s carelessness, there would be no liability because
the company owed them no duty of care.
Despite having so framed the question, Cardozo is usually praised for not taking it at
face value. Indeed, he is praised for being ‘ahead of the curve’ in recognizing that a relational
notion of legal duty makes no sense for a body of tort law meant to govern a populous
modern society characterized by routine interactions among strangers.7 Law for the modern
world, it is supposed, is law that recognizes that the duty of care in negligence law does not
attach to relationships (personal, contractual, or otherwise) but to individuals and their actions.
In short, it is a simple, nonrelational duty—a duty to act with reasonable care, full stop.8
Of course negligence liability was and is regularly imposed as a result of interactions
between persons who are not strangers. A doctor can be held liable to a patient for
malpractice, and a business can be held liable to a client for an injury caused by its unsafe
premises. Yet, even in these cases—according to the mythmakers—the relationship is not
necessary for the existence of the duty of care and it is not the source of the duty, either.
Whether interacting with a client or a stranger, one’s duty is always the same. It is not a duty
owed to any persons in particular; it is a duty owed to the state or to the world. MacPherson,
on this reading, rightly rejected the privity limit because it rightly rejected the idea that a legal actor’s
duty of care is relational – owed to a person or members of a class of persons.
And yet if Cardozo did adopt a simple, nonrelational conception of duty, an
interpretive puzzle arises. Recall that the issue Cardozo posed at the outset of his opinion is
whether Buick owed a duty of care to a person such as MacPherson. If the duty of care is a
simple duty to act reasonably, there is no point in asking this question, for the only possible
answer is “yes.” The duty of care, conceived as a simple duty, is owed to everyone. Given
this conception, it would be incoherent to suppose that a negligence claim against Buick
could fail because Buick owed no duty to take care in the manufacturing of its cars. A simple
duty of care is always present, always owed.
Why, then, did Cardozo seem to suppose that there was something meaningful to talk
about under the heading of “duty”? An answer to this puzzle was most famously proffered
twenty-five years later by William Prosser, the leading torts scholar of the mid-Twentieth
Century. According to Prosser:
The statement that there is or is not a duty begs the essential question—whether the
plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s conduct. …
6

Id. at 1051.
See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 125
(Expanded ed. 2003); Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation,
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It is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis itself. ….
“[D]uty” is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is
entitled to protection.9
The duty question cannot, on a nonrelational conception, be a question about whether the
defendant owed it to the plaintiff to take care. But it does not follow that there is nothing for
judges to consider under the heading of “duty.” Instead, judges could pose for themselves a
different question: whether policy considerations favor or disfavor the negligence claims of a
certain class of plaintiffs against a certain class of defendants.
Looking back, Prosser argued, this is exactly what had happened in Winterbottom. The
English judges framed their ruling as a no-duty ruling, yet the outcome in that case rested on
their underlying judgment that (in the words of Lord Abinger) “the most absurd and
outrageous consequences” would result if anyone injured by a carelessly made product could
sue the manufacturer.10 Winterbottom’s no-duty ruling, like all no-duty rulings, is best
understood as a judicial grant of an exemption from the default rule that liability will attach
when one person carelessly injures another. Winterbottom never denied that manufacturers
were under some duty to take care that their products not injure others. After all, those in
privity could recover for their product-related injuries. Rather it had adopted a policy-based
limit on the aggregate liability facing manufacturers; one that, in the name of the greater
good, blocked many victims of careless conduct from recovering damages.
According to Prosser and others, one of Cardozo’s great achievements in MacPherson
was to perceive that the reduction of the morally tinged duty issue to a question of public
policy need not have the regressive valence given to it by decisions such as Winterbottom.
Indeed, the deconstruction of duty promised to liberate judges to remake negligence law in a
more progressive mold. To appreciate—as Cardozo is said to have appreciated—that duty is
“not sacrosanct in itself” is to recognize that everything turns on the underlying policy
question. What a judge faced with a duty question needs to determine is whether there are
compelling reasons to insulate manufacturers from liability for injuries caused by their
carelessly made products. Even if a broad exemption might have been warranted for
manufacturers in 1842, by 1916 it was not. If anything, by the latter date there were powerful
reasons of deterrence and compensation to hold Buick and other manufacturers liable. If
duty is policy, and policy factors favor liability for negligence, then judges had no reason to
provide manufacturers with the protection of the privity rule.
B. Legislation, Not Adjudication
Negligence cases like Winterbottom and MacPherson seem in the first instance to deal
with “private” matters. These are disputes between an injurer and a victim that call for an
9
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adjudication of the rights and duties of each. Broader questions as to the social value or
significance of validating or rejecting the plaintiff’s complaint at best lurk in the background.
The standard account of MacPherson praises Cardozo for having moved beyond a
private-law conception of tort so as to grasp the centrality to tort law of its “public”
dimension.11 Of course the Court of Appeals was most immediately faced with deciding
whether Buick was required to pay damages to MacPherson. But in answering that question,
the Court was setting out a rule regulating manufacturer behavior and determining the ability
of consumers to obtain compensation for product-related injuries. Cardozo, it is said,
recognized that the adjudicative task facing the Court of Appeals—deciding Buick’s liability to
MacPherson—boiled down to the legislative task of fashioning a rule that would properly
incentivize manufacturers, or would provide appropriate compensation to persons injured by
poorly made products.
For these reasons, MacPherson has been cast as an important instance of a
sophisticated, modern judge recognizing that tort law is really a species of public law. Judges
presiding over tort cases are not village elders who gather to ponder how neighbors ought to
treat one another. They are government officials charged with attending to the public
welfare. More than anything else, tort law is a delegation of power to judges (and juries) to
issue rules and regulations that can be expected to redound to the public good, either
because the threat of tort liability will deter unsafe, antisocial conduct, or because tort
liability will help injury victims shift the cost of their losses to others who, for one reason or
another, ought to bear those losses. Just as Winterbottom was a conscious or semi-conscious
effort at legislating laissez faire, MacPherson, the thinking goes, turned on Cardozo’s quite
deliberate rejection of that policy in favor of a more progressive, consumer-protective policy.
This perspective on MacPherson was fueled in part by the famous set of lectures that
Cardozo later gave at Yale Law School.12 In The Nature of the Judicial Process, Cardozo candidly
acknowledged the role of discretion in appellate adjudication and the need for judges to look
beyond precedents to reach sensible decisions in contested cases. Seen in this light,
MacPherson is taken to epitomize the triumph of a functionalist approach to adjudication over
a formalistic conception of adjudication as a mere exercise in logic. A formalistic judge might
have supposed that MacPherson could and should be resolved by a divination of the true
meaning of the phrase “inherently dangerous,” or by an arid exercise in analogy. (Are cars
more like coaches and steam boilers, or more like medicines, scaffolds, and coffee urns?)
Cardozo, it is supposed, recognized that any such exercise was of limited value and that the
case before the Court posed the question of whether, in light of the social realities of
manufacturer-consumer transactions, it would be useful and fair to hold car manufacturers
liable for carelessness causing injury to consumers.
Relatedly, MacPherson is said to have discarded an older conception of common law in
favor of a more modern and more plausible conception. On a traditional understanding of
common law’s authority, the rules and principles announced by judges in the course of
11
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deciding particular disputes claim authority for the general population in large part because
those rules and principles roughly track prevailing social norms. Judge-made common law
could demand allegiance only insofar as it embodies longstanding custom; its rules could
then claim to be rules that members of society already held ‘in common.’ Conversely, judicial
decisions that were out in front of conventional norms, or flouted them, would expose
judge-made law to criticism for being illegitimate.
Modern society’s increasing heterogeneity undermined this effort to link the common
law’s legitimacy to its incorporation of prevailing norms. No longer could judge-made law be
justified as reflexively applying rules already to some degree recognized in everyday life.
Instead, if there were any justification for the imposition of law by judges, as opposed to
democratically elected legislatures or expert regulators, it would have to be that judges were
capable of making sensible policy decisions. MacPherson was a testament to this possibility.
Cardozo adopted a rule grounded in a plausible conception of what courts could and should
do to improve product safety without overburdening manufacturers. The legitimacy of his
decision rested on its soundness as a piece of regulatory policy.
C. The Continuity between MacPherson and Strict Products Liability
The third of our three myths pertains to the significance of MacPherson for the
development of tort law and tort theory. It can be stated as follows. Even though MacPherson
was a negligence decision, in retrospect it can been understood as setting out an embryonic
form of the doctrine of strict products liability. MacPherson, the thought goes, reflected a
progressive and pragmatic appreciation of the need to adjust negligence doctrine to achieve
the goals of tort law in the domain of product-related injuries. The law of products liability
that emerged in the 1960s emerged for just the same reasons. MacPherson eliminated the
regressive formality of privity. Landmark products liability decisions such as Escola and
Greenman,13 along with Section 402A of the Second Torts Restatement,14 stripped away
additional formalities—especially the notice requirements of warranty law, and the
negligence requirement of proving not only the presence of a defect in the injury-generating
product but also the careless conduct that generated the defect—that had impeded tort law’s
ability to achieve its compensatory and deterrent purposes.
The claim that MacPherson’s practical significance resides in its having served as a
forerunner of strict products liability is not difficult to find. Torts casebooks overwhelmingly
present the decision in just this manner.15 That they do so is hardly surprising. Indeed,
Justice Roger Traynor’s famous concurrence in Escola—the opinion that paved the way for
the adoption of strict products liability—explicitly invoked MacPherson as a key precedent.16
For his part, Traynor doubtless was pleased to remind those who might be skeptical of his
13

Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
15
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MATERIALS 551 (9th ed. 2011); VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S
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proposed doctrinal revision that a member of the American judicial pantheon had largely
made his reputation on a ‘comparable’ revision. More substantively, Traynor seems to have
understood MacPherson as supporting his mission to replace an older, abstract, and
confiningly moralistic approach to tort law, represented by Winterbottom, for a modern,
engaged, pragmatic approach, supposedly epitomized by MacPherson.
Twenty years later, writing for the majority in the Greenman case—among the first
decisions overtly holding a manufacturer liable on a tort theory of strict products liability—
Traynor no longer needed to invoke Macpherson, but instead could merely cite to his Escola
opinion to confirm the emergence of an instrumental approach to liability for productrelated injuries:
We need not recanvass the reasons for imposing strict liability on the manufacturer.
They have been fully articulated in the cases cited above. (See also 2 Harper and
James, Torts, ss 28.15-28,16, pp. 1569-1574; Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer,
69 Yale L.J. 1099; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d
436, concurring opinion.) The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
protect themselves. Sales warranties serve this purpose fitfully at best. (See Prosser,
Strict Liability to the Consumer, 69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1124-1134.)17
The claim that MacPherson morphed almost effortlessly into Escola, Greenman and
Section 402A rests in part on Cardozo’s insistence that liability for product-related injuries
must be seen as a matter of tort, not contract. The absence of a contract between
Winterbottom and Wright had doomed Winterbottom’s claim: if Winterbottom had wanted
protection against the risk of injury, he should have (in Baron Alderson words) “made
himself a party to the contract.”18 MacPherson changed all this. Consumers no longer needed
to contract for protection against product-related injuries, and manufacturers could no
longer avoid liability by structuring their affairs to avoid contracting directly with consumers.
Decades later, Traynor seized on this aspect of MacPherson to explain why the warranties of
quality that had previously been understood to be contractual in nature should no longer be
limited by the formalities of the “law of sales.” Warranties of safety may have started off as
creatures of contract, but like the duty of care in negligence, they were no longer to be based
on contract, but instead were grounded in the law.
Moreover, while MacPherson was, of course, an application of the law of negligence,
Cardozo seemed to have implicitly recognized that the notion of “fault” at work in tort law
is sufficiently capacious as to blur, if not efface, not only the line between negligence and
strict liability, but also between liability understood as backward-looking accountability for
wrongdoing (on the one hand) and liability understood as a means of regulating behavior in
a forward-looking effort to achieve deterrence and compensation (on the other).

17
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The judgment for MacPherson obviously rested in part on a jury finding, affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, that Buick had been careless. But if there was ‘fault,’ it was arguably
not fault in the sense of a moral wrong. Buick purchased its wheels from a reputable
manufacturer, and it road-tested each of its cars once assembled. At trial, experts for the
plaintiff asserted that additional testing would have led to the discovery of the defective
wheel, but the evidence on this point was hardly overwhelming.19 Decisions such as
MacPherson demonstrated that, in practice, negligence law’s conception of fault permits juries
to impose liability more or less as they see fit. Strict products liability could thus be seen as
but a candid acknowledgment of the point that, in the domain of product-related injuries,
liability is not best understood as redress for wrongs, and that, instead, liability should be
understood primarily as a means of achieving loss-spreading and deterrence.20
The emerging regulatory conception of product liability law went hand-in-hand with
the idea that, in a modern economy, “consumer protection” is one of government’s basic
duties. On this point, too, MacPherson is cast as being a cutting-edge decision. When it comes
to mass-produced, mass-marketed goods, it says, the consumer is not in a position to protect
himself from product dangers – he will not be testing the soundness of his car’s wheels –
and instead relies on the expertise and diligence of manufacturers to produce suitably safe
products. In these circumstances, consumers are not only entitled to look to sellers to
protect them against product dangers, they are entitled to look to the law to ensure that there
is such protection. Again, the issue is not so much accountability for wrongdoing but how
law can be harnessed to help ensure that products sold in the commercial marketplace
actually are safe.
***
To sum up the key claims of this part: MacPherson is typically lauded as marking the
emergence and indeed triumph of a modern, realistic understanding of tort law and
common-law adjudication. Looking past the misleading language of duty, Cardozo is said to
have recognized that the real ‘duty’ question facing courts is whether to grant a policy-based
exception to the ordinary operation of negligence law. Grasping that private disputes are
really occasions for appellate courts to make regulatory policy, and rejecting the fiction that
law is found, not made, he is alleged to have fashioned a rule grounded in a sensible policy
19

James Henderson, Jr., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company: Simplifying the Facts While
Reshaping the Law, in TORT STORIES 41, 43-44, 47-48 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds.,
2003).
20
W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 98, at 692-93 (5th ed. 1984)
(identifying loss-spreading, deterrence and legal process/burden of proof considerations as the three
policies served by strict products liability). In an offhand remark in his landmark article on causation,
Guido Calabresi suggested that MacPherson should be understood as driven by “market deterrence or
compensation goals.” Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven,
Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 95 n. 36 (1975). Overt regulation by state government officials of certain
aspects of automobile safety—including requirements for headlights and windshield glass—were
underway in the 1920s and 30s. See Sally H. Clarke, Unmanageable Risks: MacPherson v. Buick and the
Emergence of a Mass Consumer Market, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 42-44 (2005).
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rationale. Eschewing facile moralism, and attuned to the emerging reality of the modern,
regulatory state, he is credited with recognizing that the key question with respect to liability
for product-related injuries is not whether somebody has committed a wrong, but whether
and how liability might achieve compensation and deterrence.
II. MACPHERSON WITHOUT MYTHS
Though widely embraced today, the foregoing accounts of MacPherson rest on an
interrelated series of misunderstandings about Cardozo’s opinion, negligence law, tort law,
and law generally.
A. Relational Duty
It is more than a little strange to read into MacPherson the notion that legal duties must
be understood as running to government, or to the public at large, or to no one at all. As
noted above, Cardozo’s opinion began by framing the question facing the Court of Appeals
as whether a duty of care was owed by a manufacturer to members of certain classes of persons not
in privity with the manufacturer. And his answer to that question was not that manufacturers owe
a duty of care to the world at large. Instead, his opinion reasoned that manufacturers owe a
duty to the persons whose life or limb probably would be endangered were their products
carelessly made. Indeed, he crisply articulated his understanding of the duty element and the
privity problem in a manner that made relationality central: “There is nothing anomalous in
a rule which imposes upon A, who has contracted with B, a duty to C and D and others
according as he knows or does not know that the subject matter of the contract is intended
for their use.”21
The notion that MacPherson stands for the embrace of a simple, nonrelational
conception of duty rests on a conflation of three ideas. We label these, respectively:
(i)

relationality (the idea that duties of care are owed to persons or members of classes
of persons);
(ii) relationship-sensitivity (the idea that the scope, and in some circumstances, the
existence, of a duty of care will turn on the relationship between the persons in
question); and
(iii) relationship-dependence (the idea that no duty of care is owed by one person to another
unless there is a contract or a pre-existing status-based relationship between them).
With these ideas pulled apart, it quickly becomes clear that one can reject (iii) without
rejecting (i) or (ii). The fact that negligence law recognizes duties of care running between
and among strangers does not establish that these duties are nonrelational in their analytic
structure. Nor does it establish that preexisting relationships between injurer and victim are
irrelevant to the existence and scope of the tort duties one owes another.
On the standard account of MacPherson, it broke from the older notion of negligence
as involving the breach of a relationship-based duty in favor of a modern notion of
21

MacPherson v. Buick, 111 N.E. 1050, 1054 (N.Y. 1916) (emphasis added).
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negligence marked by the recognition of a simple, always applicable, duty of care that runs
among strangers. There are many problems with this account, not the least of which is that it
relies on bad history. The idea of tort duties running between strangers was hardly unknown
to pre-modern law. The eminent historian J.H. Baker reports English cases from as far back
as the 1400s in which a property owner is held liable for undertaking an activity on his
property that injures a passerby.22 Whatever was erroneous about Winterbottom, and correct
about MacPherson, is not captured by the thought that we once lived in a world that only
recognized duties of care within contractual and other pre-existing relationships, and now
live in a world where duties run to strangers.
Equally mistaken is the supposition that, in order to reject Winterbottom, MacPherson
was required to adopt the idea that tort duties are owed to the world at large. One could
instead take the view—and in fact Cardozo did take the view—that tort duties are owed to
all persons within a broad class of persons. A product manufacturer, he reasoned, owes a
duty of care to members of the class of persons, some of whom probably will be injured by
the product if it is made carelessly and put to ordinary use without further tests or
inspections. This class obviously includes persons with no personal connection to the
manufacturer. Suppose that, because of Buick’s carelessness, one of its cars crashed while
being used in an ordinary manner, resulting in injury to a passenger. The passenger would
stand to recover from Buick for negligence. The fact that Buick and the passenger had no
previous interactions would be irrelevant.
Under MacPherson, the class of persons to whom manufacturers owe a duty of care is
a large and indeterminate group whose members cannot be identified in advance. One might
therefore be tempted to give a shorthand description of this duty as owed to the public at
large. But this shorthand sows confusion, for it quickly slides into the view that the duty of
care in negligence really isn’t owed to anyone in particular, but rather is a “simple” or generic
duty. As we have pointed out elsewhere, this slide has caused a great deal of mischief in
modern thinking about negligence law. For now it is enough to note that it is a slide that
Cardozo himself avoided. We know this not only from MacPherson itself but from Palsgraf as
well. Indeed, the misattribution of a nonrelational view of duty to MacPherson has played a
large part in rendering Palsgraf unintelligible to modern torts scholars.23
It is also important to emphasize that a view of duty such as Cardozo’s can
simultaneously insist that the duty of care in negligence is relational—always owed to the
members of a particular class of potential injury victims—while also insisting that duty in
negligence is relationship-sensitive, in that the presence or absence of certain kind of pre-tort
relationships between injurer and victim might determine the scope of the duty owed and, in
certain circumstances, its existence. Doctors owe duties of care to their patients that others
do not. So too do businesses with respect to customers on their premises. This is hardly
surprising, though again it is a feature of negligence law that modern commentators gloss
over. Part of the value of recognizing that tort duties are analytically relational—owed to
certain others—is that it allows one easily to grasp why relationships matter to the content of
the duties actually owed to others. On a duty-to-the-world conception, by contrast, it is
22
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something of a mystery why duties of care should be sensitive to the presence or absence of
a special relationship.
Finally, as we emphasized many years ago in The Moral of MacPherson, there is indeed
a sense in which Cardozo accepts that duties of care in negligence law are universal, but
there are two ways this can be understood.24 The duty not to batter or defraud another
person is universal. Whether one owes this sort of duty to another does not turn on any
prior relationship, but on aspects of human well being that one is obligated not to interfere
with in certain ways. Likewise, the duty to take care not to injure another person by placing a
dangerous product on the market in circumstances where it would imperil their life or limb,
does not require an identified right-bearer, but applies to various persons who foreseeably
stand to be injured by carelessness. It is a mistake, however, to suppose that the unlimited
range of persons to whom a duty is owed means that there are no beneficiaries of the duty,
or that the beneficiary is rightly identified as the state or the public. More modestly, even
those who join Prosser and others in adopting the duty-to-the-public conception of
universality have no basis for attributing that view to Cardozo in Macpherson or anywhere
else.
B. Pragmatic Conceptualism in Adjudication
One of the interpretive challenges faced by standard accounts is that MacPherson in
most respects reads like a traditional judicial opinion. Cardozo is concerned to answer the
doctrinal question of whether Buick owed a duty of care to a person such as MacPherson.
And he answers that question overwhelmingly by means of a careful parsing of precedents,
with occasional asides on the immediate practical implications of its analysis. In other words,
his opinion seems actually to be concerned to answer the question of whether, under
prevailing law, Buick committed negligence against MacPherson.
The suggestion that disguised policy reasoning is the ‘real’ engine of MacPherson is
driven in part by the thought (which we reject) that, while Cardozo’s doctrinal analysis is
presented as a faithful application of precedent, in fact it stretches precedent to reach the
progressive result he sought. For example, in his MacPherson dissent, Chief Judge Bartlett in
effect accused Cardozo of playing fast and loose with the idea of a “thing of danger” by
treating automobiles to be no less “imminently dangerous to life” than “poisons, explosives,
deadly weapons—things whose normal function it is to injure or destroy.”25 Cardozo, he
claimed, had taken a narrow exception to the privity rule first recognized for mislabeled
poisons in Thomas v. Winchester and, without saying so, converted it into the opposite rule that
privity is not required.
To take this view of MacPherson is, however, simply to fall for Buick Motor
Company’s highly tendentious treatment of New York precedents—a treatment that,
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notably, only Bartlett accepted.26 Thomas v. Winchester, which was decided more than a half
century prior to MacPherson, did not rest on the idea that a special rule was needed only for
those products whose point is to cause harm (and, indeed, the product in that case was
intended as a medication, and only harmful because it had been mislabeled). Although a
subsequent Court of Appeals decision—Loop v. Litchfield27—had entertained this
characterization of Thomas, the Court had abandoned it well before the time of MacPherson.
True, the litigants in MacPherson appear to have teed up two different interpretations
of when New York negligence law would permit product manufacturers to be sued by
persons not in privity with the manufacturer. On Buick’s view, the product needed to belong
to the dangerous-by-its-very-nature category. On MacPherson’s, if the product was of a type
such that it was dangerous-when-negligently-made—in the sense of ‘an accident waiting to
happen’—a duty of care was owed to a user who could be expected to face that danger. Yet
the cases were hardly in equipoise as between these two interpretations. As Andrew
Kaufman put it: “The New York Court of Appeals was already close to the MacPherson
result, and Cardozo was most ready to innovate when the distance he had to travel from
established law was small.”28 Already in Devlin v. Smith, decided in 1882, the New York Court
of Appeals had rejected Buick’s reading of the cases. Devlin had allowed a claim by injured
workers against the manufacturer of a defective scaffold, notwithstanding the absence of
privity. In so holding, it characterized New York law as holding that third parties can recover
when “the defect is such as to render the article in itself imminently dangerous, and serious
injury to any person using it, is a natural and probable consequence of its use.”29 In other
words, the Court of Appeals had already stated more than three decades before MacPherson
that the relevant focus is on the dangerousness of the product when carelessly made, not the
dangerousness of the product when made with care.
To make matters worse for Buick, in the decade immediately prior to MacPherson, the
Court of Appeals had decided only two negligence cases involving plaintiffs not in privity
26
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with the manufacturer: Statler and Torgenson. As noted above, Statler involved a coffee urn and
Torgenson involved a bottle of seltzer water, and in both cases the absence of privity was
deemed no bar to recovery. Neither a coffee urn nor a bottle of carbonated water has harm
to humans as its raison-d’etre, and neither posed a baseline risk of injury so high as to warrant
placing them in a separate category of extraordinarily dangerous products. And so Cardozo
was hardly engaging in legerdemain when he rejected the narrow reading of Thomas once
entertained by the Court in Loop and advocated in MacPherson by Buick: “whatever the rule
in Thomas v. Winchester may once have been, it has no longer that restricted meaning.”30
Cardozo’s MacPherson opinion is thus easily and rightly taken at face value. It says,
with powerful precedential support, that New York common law is most cogently
interpreted as requiring the manufacturer of a product to exercise due care towards persons
beyond those in privity, if it is the kind of product that would seriously endanger life and
limb if defective. Once this framework is recognized, one quite easily reaches the conclusion
that car manufacturers owe a duty of care to those who would use the car without inspection
and who could be expected to be injured if the car were carelessly made. By contrast, any
effort to read it as a legislative decision that rests on instrumentalist policy analysis will
inevitably be strained. Indeed, such a reading is so implausible that its most prominent
advocates—Leon Green, Grant Gilmore, and Richard Posner—were forced to take
desperate measures to salvage it. MacPherson doesn’t read like a policy decision, they say, only
because Cardozo realized that, if he were forthright about his policy-oriented approach, he
would scare off his audience (the hidebound bench and bar). In Gilmore’s phrase, Cardozo
“went to extraordinary lengths to hide his light under a bushel.”31
In the manner of all good conspiracy theories, the Green-Gilmore-Posner reading is
resistant to outright falsification. It is nonetheless readily shown to be feeble. Nothing in
Cardozo’s voluminous writings—his opinions, his extra-judicial writings, his
correspondence—suggest that he was engaged in this sort of misdirection in this or any
other opinion. To the contrary, they suggest that what he wrote is what he meant. Likewise,
there is no evidence that Cardozo was trained in, or comfortable with, the sort of policy
analysis that is said to be the secret engine of his decision. Again, if anything, there is
evidence to the contrary.32
Gilmore, Posner and others have felt compelled to offer implausible interpretations
of MacPherson because they supposed (correctly) that Cardozo was a great judge, and further
supposed (incorrectly) that one cannot be a great judge without being an instrumentalist
about adjudication. The latter supposition is but one expression of the familiar, though
deeply confused, thought that, since law is a human creation that serves human purposes, it
can only be applied and analyzed instrumentally. It should go without saying that practices
and institutions created by humans often serve human purposes indirectly.
For example, professional baseball provides, among other things, entertainment, as
well as fostering a form of loyalty that many fans find rewarding. It hardly follows that the
30
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home-plate umpire employed for a particular game should call balls and strikes based on
whether each call, or the run of calls, will make the particular game in question entertaining,
or will promote fan loyalty. Our point is not to suggest, as Chief Justice Roberts famously
once did, that the task of a Supreme Court justice closely resembles that of a home-plate
umpire calling balls and strikes.33 It is rather to support the simple and obvious (yet oftignored) point that practices and institutions often serve ends indirectly, through the
observance and application of their rules, rather than through acts and decisions that are
relentlessly instrumental.
In his insightful symposium contribution, Professor Witt generously credits us for
capturing the way in which Cardozo approached legal issues from a perspective “internal” to
the common law.34 At the same time, he suggests that Cardozo’s conception of common law
judging (and ours) is seriously incomplete, both intellectually and institutionally. Legal rules,
Witt observes, must sooner or later account for themselves not by reference to what has
been decided in the past, but on what they stand to accomplish. Similarly, common law
courts must justify their role as but one among the many organs of modern government.
While Witt claims that Cardozo acknowledged these truths, he also worries that Cardozo
never explained (nor have we in our work) how to reconcile a commitment to precedentbased reasoning with law’s being a purposive institution, and never explained the place of
the common law courts in the regulatory state. Witt suggestively concludes that there may be
a Burkean story to tell here: that the common law’s backward-looking orientation and its
insistence on principle might serve as a helpful counterweight to the forward-looking,
rationalistic methods of the regulatory agencies that today are the face of government.35
Our view and, we think Cardozo’s, is that Witt’s framing of the contrast between
‘internal’ and ‘external’ perspectives, and between common law and regulatory law, is too
stark. Among the modern state’s, and modern law’s, purposes is the articulation of norms of
interpersonal conduct, and the determination of the duties we owe and the rights that we
have against one another. This is a task that judges have always undertaken and, by and large,
are well equipped by their legal training and experience to undertake. And it is one that
plainly connects to values that matter, including the value of encouraging responsible
behavior and of holding people and firms accountable for mistreating others.
Common-law adjudication, meanwhile, can be and is both precedent-based and
pragmatic. Indeed, Cardozo’s genius resided precisely in his ability to combine these
dimensions of judicial decision-making, and to do so seamlessly. MacPherson, as admirers
have long observed, is anything but a formalistic decision, but it is also not an exercise in
33
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discretionary policymaking. It represents instead Cardozo’s gift for synthesizing, refining,
revising and pushing forward ideas immanent in the law.36
In a lecture published eight years after Macpherson was decided, Cardozo described the
state of the law prior to the decision as follows:
A mass of judgments, more or less relevant, had been rendered by the same and other
courts. A body of particulars existed on which an hypothesis might be reared. None
the less, their implications were equivocal. We see this in the fact that the judgment
of the court was not rendered without dissent. Whether the law can be said to have
existed in advance of the decision, will depend upon the varying estimates of the
nexus between the conclusion and the existing principle and precedent.37
If a “formalist” judge is one who supposes that common law adjudication involves a judge
divining an uncontestably correct rule from prior decisions, Cardozo clearly was not a
formalist. He concedes, after all, that there were different ways of understanding the “thing
of danger” category. In turn, it might seem plausible to assert that Cardozo understood
adjudication, at least in hard cases, to consist of an exercise in discretionary lawmaking, akin
to legislation.
As many before us have pointed out, this last inference goes too far. It is one thing to
concede, as practically everyone does, that, in hard cases, more than one rule can be
fashioned. It is quite another to suppose that adjudication in such cases amounts to anything
resembling de novo lawmaking on the model of legislation. Cardozo’s use of the term
“hypothesis” is quite helpful in capturing the space between these two ideas. First, it suggests
36
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that the immediate task at hand, even in hard cases, is that of inducing from prior decisions a
rule or principle that will resolve the dispute before the court. Often, Cardozo suggested, the
judge will be aided in this task by paying careful attention to the historical context in which
prior decisions were made, as well as prevailing social practices (if any) among those whose
conduct will most immediately be affected by the court’s decision, and prevailing social
norms. These legal, historical and sociological inquiries, he emphasized, are all in aid of
making the best sense one can of the ‘direction’ in which the law is moving.
For Cardozo, it surely mattered that Winterbottom had been decided in 1842, and that,
in the seventy five years leading up to MacPherson, a growing corpus of New York and
English decisions had declined to apply the privity rule. It also mattered to Cardozo that
prevailing political sentiments were arguably moving away from rugged individualism to less
stringently individualistic forms of liberalism.
Whatever one may think of this sort of exercise, it bears little resemblance to the idea
of a judge legislating based on his or her view of the consequences that will follow from
adopting the rule. To be sure, Cardozo allowed that practical considerations could figure in
the judicial resolution of a hard case. In particular, he accepted that the prospect of highly
undesirable practical consequences was a ground for rejecting a rule that could otherwise
claim validity in terms of its fit with precedent and practice. This was the upshot of an oftquoted passage from another decision for which Cardozo wrote the opinion—Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche.38 Ultramares held that accountants should not be held liable to all persons who
foreseeably might suffer economic loss as a result of their malpractice. Contrasting the scope
of liability for fraud, Cardozo reasoned as follows:
A different question develops when we ask whether [the defendant accountants]
owed a duty to [all creditors and investors of the audited firm] to make [the audit]
without negligence. If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the
failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose
accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a
duty that exposes [it] to these consequences.39
The point here is not that duty questions boil down to, or are constituted by, instrumental
questions. Cardozo is not making a theoretical claim about the meaning of duty. Rather he is
making a pragmatic point about judicial decision-making: the probable consequences of
different duty rules are among the considerations that bear on the question of whether to
recognize and how to define the duty owed by a certain kind of actor to certain classes of
potential victim.
A similar approach to reasoning about duty, though it pointed toward a different
result, is on display in MacPherson itself. Whatever plausibility Winterbottom may have once
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had, Cardozo’s opinion asserted, it made little practical sense in an era in which car
manufacturers had adopted the dealership model of distribution:
The dealer was indeed the one person of whom it might be said with some approach
to certainty that by him the car would not be used. Yet the defendant would have us
say that he was the one person whom it was under a legal duty to protect. The law
does not lead us to so inconsequent a conclusion. Precedents drawn from the days of
travel by stage coach do not fit the conditions of travel to-day. The principle that the
danger must be imminent does not change, but the things subject to the principle do
change. They are whatever the needs of life in a developing civilization require them
to be.40
In other words, there would be something odd about inducing from New York precedents a
rule of duty for product manufacturers according to which the only persons owed care are
those who will interact with the products in a manner that will rarely, if ever, generate
injuries, even as there are many others, to whom no duty is owed, who can be expected to
interact with the same products in ways that will cause injuries. If manufacturers are to be
subject to the law of negligence with respect to injuries caused by their products, they surely
must be held to owe duties to at least some of the persons whom they predictably will injure
through their carelessness. This is exactly the principle that runs through the pre-MacPherson
case law: insofar as a product that will be sent out into the world without being further
inspected for safety is a product that poses a probable danger to certain classes of persons,
the manufacturer’s duty is owed to those persons.
In rejecting the view that Cardozo was being an activist judge and in rejecting the
instrumentalist account of his opinion, we are not denying that both moral and practical
considerations figured in his decision. To the contrary. The point is that the question of
whether Buick had a duty of care to product users like MacPherson is not shorthand for
whether there should be liability. Rather it is, to a very significant extent, what it appears to
be—namely, the practically and morally informed extraction of a principle from precedent.41
Judges who are charged with overseeing how tort suits will proceed are being asked whether
the law makes it incumbent upon a car manufacturer to be vigilant of the life and limb of car
users. Focusing on what would be relevant to answering the moral question—what sorts of
interests are being risked, how much reliance there is, how well situated users are to protect
themselves—Cardozo of course answered that there is such a duty. To put the point
somewhat more sensitively, Cardozo decided that, given this constellation of circumstances,
40
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the absence of a contractual relationship did not suffice to establish that there was no legal
duty of care owed to product users.
C. Negligence as a Wrong
Insofar as MacPherson is taken to herald the arrival of a nonwrongs-based, purely
instrumental conception of strict products liability, it has been badly miscast. To see this, one
only need to contrast Cardozo’s language to that of Traynor in Greenman42 (quoted above):
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place and limb in peril
when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the
consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge
that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new
tests then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a
duty to make it carefully. That is as far as we are required to go for the decision of
this case. . . . There is here no break in the chain of cause and effect. In such
circumstances, the presence of a known danger, attendant upon a known use, makes
vigilance a duty. We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and
limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract
and nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We
have put its source in the law.43
Quite evidently, Cardozo’s line of attack on the privity rule come from within a moralized
understanding of negligence as a legal wrong. The principle he puts forward is not about
where costs are best placed to provide compensation or achieve deterrence, but about who is
really responsible for an injury.
Nor was MacPherson an outlier within Cardozo’s judicial corpus. In fact, he quite
consistently displayed reluctance to shift from negligence to strict liability, even when facing
a claim by a vulnerable individual against a corporate defendant that was well situated to bear
the cost. In Adams v. Bullock, for example, Cardozo ruled that a trolley company could not be
held liable in negligence to a boy who was electrocuted when a long piece of wire that the
boy was dangling over the edge of a bridge made contact with the company’s uninsulated
wires.44 Liability could not be imposed, he concluded, because there was nothing about the
particular location of this incident that should have alerted the company to a heightened risk
of injury and hence a need to take particular precautionary measures there. Moreover, the
taking of systemic measures to avert such injuries would have demanded of the trolley
company something well beyond reasonable care: namely, the abandonment of the
enterprise in anything like the form in which it had operated. To hold the trolley company
liable on these terms would have been to treat it as an “insurer” of electrocution victims.45
Negligence is negligence, Adams insists. It is not strict liability.
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In light of Adams and other decisions, it is implausible to read MacPherson as somehow
downplaying the connections between negligence liability and ordinary notions of
wrongdoing and responsibility. So far as Cardozo was concerned, when a court sets about
determining whether a defendant should be held liable to a plaintiff for negligence, it aims to
determine whether, under existing doctrine or a fair extension of it, the defendant can be
held responsible to the plaintiff for having carelessly injured the plaintiff. And this
determination requires judgments as to the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct.
Our point is not that Cardozo was inalterably opposed to all forms of ‘strict’ liability.
There are genuine legal wrongs that involve the violation of strict standards of conduct —
most notably in contract law but also in certain applications of tort law—and Cardozo was
clearly open to recognizing at least some of these.46 For example, in Ryan v. Progressive Stores, a
grocery store that sold a loaf of bread with a pin inside of it was held liable to the plaintiff,
whose mouth was injured when he bit into the bread.47 Cardozo was willing to impose
warranty-based liability on the retailer notwithstanding that the bread was baked by someone
else and was sold in a sealed container: the failure of the product to meet the quality
standards that the retailer had implicitly warranted was sufficient. In short, Cardozo regarded
it as a wrong, in and of itself, for a seller to injure a consumer by selling the consumer a
dangerously substandard product, irrespective of the degree of care exercised by the seller. It
is clear, however, that Cardozo regarded the wrong in Ryan as a contractual wrong—a breach
of an implicit term of the agreement between retailer and consumer—rather than a tort
wrong.
Whether Cardozo would have been willing to recognize strict, warranty-like liability in
tort rather than contract, and thus treat causation of injury through the sale of a dangerously
defective product as a wrong irrespective of any promise of quality, is an open question.
However, even if he would have, the idea of treating injury through the sale of a defective
product as a wrong is quite distinct from the idea of strict products liability as an instrument
for the achievement of compensation and deterrence. And it is the latter idea that is at the
heart of Escola and Greenman. In stark contrast to Cardozo’s antipathy to insurance rationales
within the domain of legal wrongs, these authorities favored a fusion of warranty and tort
precisely so that liability could be used to spread the cost of injuries, to spare plaintiffs the
challenge of proving wrongdoing, and to improve deterrence. None of these rationales
figured in MacPherson. To the contrary, Cardozo clearly thought about Buick’s responsibility
in the more traditional, duty- and wrong-based terms of the common law of torts.
III. ONE HUNDRED YEARS ON: THE COSTS OF
MISUNDERSTANDING MACPHERSON
The long tradition of misreading MacPherson is, alas, not merely an academic matter.
It has instead helped to fuel a series of problematic developments in law and legal theory.
Here we briefly sketch some of those problems.
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A.
Taking Responsibility Seriously
The non-relational conception of duty looks progressive because it seems to sit well
with the following sentiment. Never mind the issue of whether manufacturers ought to conceive of
consumers as persons to whom care is owed: that issue, if it is even cogent, simply obscures the real question,
which is whether a person hurt by a product should be able to recover, absent privity. Responsibility to
consumers is aspirational and moralistic; liability is real.
On our view, it is a huge mistake to put aside the question of to whom vigilance and
care is owed and to focus exclusively on liability-as-threat. The law needs more tools in its
tool kit. Large businesses are costly to sue, are often well-positioned to stonewall, and can
frequently defeat even plausible claims. It surely is important that consumers have the power
to sue manufacturers, to recover damages from them, and to negotiate for compensation
against a background where there is an enforceable legal right. But Cardozo was onto
something even more important.
Companies that make products may be artificial entities, but they still have
responsibilities. It is critical that those who work for manufacturers maintain a selfconception as actors who take consumers’ safety to be important. We as a society want the
social safety norms that govern interpersonal interactions to govern business conduct, too.
The increasing dependence on ‘liability rules’ for social control of corporate conduct is often
inefficient and ineffectual. Large companies and those who control them need to operate in
a way that mimics the actions of natural persons—they need to understand themselves as
obligated to be vigilant of risks to their consumers and to act accordingly.
Our point is far less precious than it might seem. Twentieth Century corporate law in
fact made a psychological turn of the sort we are advocating, albeit in a different context. It
is now standard fare for judicial decisions, and for law school and business school courses,
to emphasize that corporate directors and managers must take very seriously the fiduciary
duties they owe to shareholders.48 The point, it seems, is to guide directors’ conduct—to
force them to frame decisions (in tender offer cases, for example) in a way that puts
shareholders’ financial interests ahead of the interests of current management, employees, or
local communities. Corporate law is telling these actors how they are supposed to think
about their responsibilities and it is using the language of duty to do so. For better or worse,
this message seems to have affected how these actors actually think about their
responsibilities.49
The example of legal duties to shareholders has two important implications for our
analysis. First, it provides a concrete example of how a way of understanding duties, even in
the ‘bottom-line’ oriented domain of business, might actually translate into an adjustment in
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norms and conduct, and does by means other than a mere threat of liability divorced from a
notion of wrongdoing. The second point goes in a different direction. The importance,
today, of having publicly held companies be vigilant of consumers’ physical well being is
especially great precisely because of the increased focus on shareholders. The duty to
maximize shareholder well-being must be pursued within the limits of the law (at least in
principle). But if tort law is understood in terms of liability rules, rather than actual
mandatory duties of conduct, then we have set things up so that risking tort liability in the
corporate decision-making context may actually seem, from the internal point of view of the
corporate actor, to be the legally correct choice.
One need not join Occupy Wall Street to see a serious problem with the current state
of thinking on corporate responsibilities. Were one to look at publicly held pharmaceutical
companies, for example, one might well find a striking contrast between managerial attitudes
toward contract and tort. Managers probably view their legally imposed fiduciary duties to
shareholders as having obligatory force. At the same time, they probably tend to view tort as
merely a collection of liability rules: the cost they will incur if consumers are hurt by defects
in their products, if those consumers sue, and if the cases cannot be fended off. The irony is
thick. 175 years after Winterbottom, contract—in the form of duties to shareholders—is back
on top, even in the Thomas v. Winchester domain of dangerous drugs. Tort duties, meanwhile,
are given less then full credence. Read rightly, Cardozo’s MacPherson opinion points in a very
different direction.
B.
Instrumentalism and Tort Reform
No doubt there is something temperamental or personal about our preference for
pragmatic conceptualism over reductive instrumentalism—for Cardozo over Holmes, and,
yes, for Dworkin over Posner. But it is entirely wrong to suppose that, by rejecting
instrumentalism, we are favoring a politically conservative agenda over a politically
progressive one. True, in the middle of the twentieth century, it was usually progressives
who advocated an instrumentalist approach to tort law. But our whole point is that there
was, back then, and is now, a different, and better way to get to a more progressive tort law,
and it is the one found in MacPherson. A huge part of our anti-instrumentalist agenda has
been rooted in the idea that instrumentalism in tort law has become a battering ram for a
well-funded and vigorous tort reform movement, both in courts and in legislatures.
As to the courts, Prosser’s avowedly reductive analysis of duty at first did serve as a
progressive mantra, particularly for the California Supreme Court in decisions such as
Rowland, Dillon, and Tarasoff.50 But for the last 35 years, judges and justices who came of age
in the tort reform era see Prosser’s famous “shorthand for policy” quip in a wholly different
way. Ensuring compensation and deterrence are no longer major policy objectives, or at
least are not thought to be best implemented through tort law. When it comes to torts,
courts worry incessantly about floodgates and frivolous litigation, rising costs of products
and services due to liability insurance, and the distorting effects of tort liability on
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spontaneous activities of ordinary people. We are not saying these concerns do not matter.
Sometimes they do. We are merely observing, from the vantage point of 2016, how
shortsighted and unrealistic it is to suppose that, if courts are told that “duty” is simply a
blunderbuss policy decision, they will move the law in a progressive direction.
As we are (appropriately) celebrating MacPherson at a meeting in New York, it is fitting
to mention a recent Second Circuit decision, Munn v. The Hotchkiss School.51 The plaintiff,
Cara Munn, a 15 year-old student, was bitten by a tick in the forests of Northeast China
while on a hike organized by her prep school. The tick carried encephalitis, and the plaintiff
consequently suffered permanent and serious brain damage. Hotchkiss Academy, the
defendant, had failed to warn students of the risk of serious insect-borne illnesses in this
region. Moreover, it had not directed or encouraged the students to wear long clothing or
insect repellant; and it allowed her and her friends to take an especially dense and buggy path
from the top of the mountain they had climbed. In the District Court in Connecticut, a jury
awarded the plaintiff $10 million in economic damages and $31.5 in non-economic
damages. Hotchkiss argued on appeal that students and society would suffer if schools were
forced to discontinue field trips because of fear of liability, and hence the Second Circuit
should rule that the school owed its students no duty of care. While the Second Circuit did
not accept this argument, it did not reject it either, instead certifying the duty issue to the
Connecticut Supreme Court, along with the issue of whether the damages were excessive
under Connecticut law.
We see the policy argument of course, and we see a potential basis for supposing that
the Second Circuit should order a new trial on damages. Perhaps a careful review of the
record might even suggest the propriety of entering judgment as a matter of law for the
defendant on the issue of breach or causation. But there is no serious argument that
Hotchkiss should prevail on its no-duty argument. As a matter of Connecticut law, and the
law of other states, it would be absurd to suggest that a school owes no duty of care to its
minor students. Yet Hotchkiss’s lawyers, seizing on the Prosserian language of prior
Connecticut Supreme Court decisions, are understandably trying to use the modern “no
duty” rubric to enact a bit of tort reform. Over and over again, these sorts of defense
gambits have worked. We hope they do not in Munn.
Our point on tort reform and instrumentalism concerns not only courts but also
legislatures. Indeed, since the heyday of progressive instrumentalism in the 1960s and 70s,
the most substantial changes in tort law have been made in the statehouse, not the
courtroom. This is no coincidence. Our understanding of tort law as rooted in principled
common law reasoning made courts the obvious place for change and development. By
contrast, if tort law—at an appellate level—is really just judicial policymaking, then there is
no reason to presume it belongs in the domain of the judiciary. Legislatures, it is supposed,
are better at getting the big picture of policy implications. Even if not, they enjoy democratic
authority that judges often lack. The conception of tort law as rooted in instrumentalist
reasoning has quite naturally led to a devolution of control from courts to legislatures. This
is not to deny that legislatures have always been entitled to exercise such power, nor that
they sometimes did exercise that power. But today, in dozens and dozens of states, the
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institutional understanding has shifted on who will be making the law about who can sue
whom for what and how much they will receive if they win. Needless to say, we think the
partial shift of de facto tort lawmaking to legislatures has been something of a disaster.
C.
Mistaking Regulation for Redress, and Redress for Regulation
We have argued that scholars have overstated the continuity between MacPherson and
strict products liability. This, too, is a mistake of some moment, but it is admittedly more
difficult to see why.
Preliminarily, we recognize that progressives have sometimes benefited by depicting
strict products liability as simply an extension of negligence. Even today, a substantial
domain of strict products liability law remains in place, notwithstanding the efforts of
businesses and some academics to discredit it. Contemporary efforts to cast strict products
liability as based on risk-utility analysis, and hence largely continuous with negligence, have
amounted to a rewriting of legal history. Arguably, however, the rewrite was well-motivated
and somewhat successful in warding off more aggressive tort reform. We shall leave this
point to one side, for the moment, and depict the other side: the regressive consequences of
overstating the continuity between MacPherson and strict products liability.
First, the mythical supposition that there is no real gap between MacPherson’s
application of negligence law and Greenman’s recognition of strict products liability, though
originally offered by Traynor and others to justify the emergence of the latter doctrine, is
today being harnessed in the opposite direction, to pull products liability back toward
negligence. In particular, the Products Liability portion of the Third Torts Restatement puts
forward several provisions that articulate a view of products liability as really just a form of
negligence, and several of those provisions tend to be much more helpful to defendants than
current doctrine in many states. Requiring design defect plaintiffs to prove that the product
fails the risk-utility test, rather than the consumer expectation test, is a clear example.52
Another move benefitting defendants was the expansion of the notion that state-of-the-art
sets a limit on product defectiveness, and the related abandonment of hindsight-based
standards of defectiveness.53 The decision to have comparative fault apply to products
liability law—recognized in, though not led by, the Restatement—was also a move in the
direction of negligence law.54
Second, numerous jurisdictions now seem to view central features of strict products
liability as anomalous and unfair—bridling at what strikes them as ‘naked’ redistribution—
and have therefore changed them via legislative reform. Most notably, several states have
enacted “closed container” laws that eliminate the possibility of strict liability for retailers
who sell defective products that are sent by the manufacturer in sealed packaging.55 These
reforms rest in part on the intuition that tort law is simply too inattentive to ordinary notions
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of fairness and responsibility when it imposes liability on perfectly innocent retailers merely
to serve goals such as compensation or deterrence. In other words, they play on the picture
of strict retailer liability as regulation and redistribution. As we noted above, Cardozo himself
accepted the imposition of liability for a dangerous product causing injury in a closed
container case, but relied upon warranty to do so.56 On this approach, one might be able to
fashion a justification for strict retailer liability on the ground that a commercial seller’s
injuring of another person through the sale of a defective product is a distinct, strictly
defined wrong—one that it is difficult to avoid committing, sooner or later—within the
family of legal wrongs that constitutes tort law. However, the mythical account of
MacPherson’s connection to strict liability, which purports to locate that connection in an
underlying commitment to a regulatory conception of tort liability, cannot take advantage of
this line of reasoning, and instead renders strict retailer liability vulnerable to the objections
that have given rise to statutory reforms.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that the most impressive judicial movement
against tort liability in the past two decades has been the Supreme Court’s aggressive
application of preemption doctrine. In developing this doctrine, the Supreme Court has
managed to sheer away a significant amount of liability for medical devices and prescription
drugs and of course some—less systematically—for other products. In our view, both in its
8-1 decision on medical devices,57 and its 5-4 design defect decision on generic drugs,58 the
Court managed to enact a sort of back-door tort reform only because of its failure to
attribute adequate significance to the real differences between defect-based strict products
liability and negligence law.
Justice Alito’s Bartlett opinion exemplifies the problem most clearly. Impossibility
preemption applies only where the requirements of state law and the requirements of federal
law are impossible to satisfy simultaneously. The defendant, Mutual Pharmaceutical, argued
that any design defect tort action under New Hampshire state law was inconsistent with the
federal-law requirement that it design its drug Sulindac to match the brand name drug Clinoril,
of which Sulindac was a generic version. The respondent, Bartlett, argued that New
Hampshire products liability law was strict, and therefore not regulatory in a sense that
constitutes a requirement. On that basis, she argued, impossibility preemption was
inapplicable. Writing for the Court, Justice Alito disagreed:
We begin by identifying petitioner’s duties under state law. As an initial matter,
respondent is wrong in asserting that the purpose of New Hampshire’s design-defect
cause of action “is compensatory, not regulatory.” Brief for Respondent 19. Rather,
New Hampshire’s design-defect cause of action imposes affirmative duties on
manufacturers.
Respondent is correct that New Hampshire has adopted the doctrine of strict
liability in tort as set forth in Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See
2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1963 and 1964) (hereinafter Restatement
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2d). See Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 110 N. H. 36, 37-39, 260 A. 2d 111,
112-113 (1969). Under the Restatement — and consequently, under New Hampshire
tort law — “[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused” even though he “has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of the product.” Restatement 2d § 402A, at 347-348.
But respondent’s argument conflates what we will call a “strict-liability” regime (in
which liability does not depend on negligence, but still signals the breach of a duty)
with what we will call an “absolute-liability” regime (in which liability does not reflect
the breach of any duties at all, but merely serves to spread risk). New Hampshire has
adopted the former, not the latter. . . . 59
What is stunning about this passage is that it uses the term “conflates” in place of an
argument, as if melding together duty-based liability based on the sale of a dangerous
product and risk-spreading were an intellectual confusion or mistake. A great deal of what
Greenman and 402A were about was finding a middle ground between a mandate-like
message for products manufacturers about what care they must take in marketing products,
on the one hand, and treating them simply as deep pockets or insurers for a group of
products users, on the other. Traynor, Prosser and others thought there was such a middle
ground, in which defect-based liability simultaneously spread risk and incentivized safety.
The Second Restatement and most state courts and legislatures adopted strict products
liability because they shared that view, at least for manufacturing defects and design defects.
From our brief study, the courts of New Hampshire largely accepted that view, too.
Our two earlier examples—closed container statutes, and the changes wrought by the
products liability provisions of the Restatement (Third)—help to crystallize the admittedly
slippery point we are making about Bartlett, and push it one step further. Strict products
liability in tort, at least for manufacturing defects and design defects and at least in some
jurisdictions in its first generation, was crafted to serve a compensatory and risk-spreading
function, but to do so in a qualified way by requiring proof of defect, as opposed to
imposing ‘absolute’ liability that would extend even to injuries caused by sound products.
Liability for design defect based on a product’s failure to meet consumer expectations, or
based on a failure to satisfy a hindsight-based version of the risk-utility test, pursued
compensation and deterrence by adopting a form of liability that lies somewhere in between
negligence and absolute liability. That is what strict products liability, at least in its initial
formulations, was all about.
Cardozo on the New York Court of Appeals and Traynor on the Supreme Court of
California were both great common law judges, but their approaches were not the same.
Cardozo sought to modernize tort law while remaining true to the idea that torts are not
merely wrongs in name, but hinge liability on the actual commission of a wrong. Traynor
fused negligence and warranty so as to eliminate the wrongfulness of a defendant’s conduct
as a basis for liability, even though liability was still said to sound in ‘tort.’ Insofar as other
states followed Traynor’s approach, they adopted a qualified liability-rule approach to
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product-related injuries in which liability does not hinge on the breach, by sellers, of a
genuine obligation to alter their conduct to avoid causing injuries to consumers.
Why did Justice Alito and four other members of the Court get this wrong? No
doubt there is some truth in the standard observation that the ‘right wing’ of the Roberts
Court is pro-business and friendly to tort reform. But a large part of the answer, we think,
goes back to a misunderstanding of MacPherson as an early anticipation of late mid-late
Twentieth Century products liability law. Negligence and strict products liability are
importantly different. Even if—as we mentioned much earlier in this section—there has
been substantial success in the effort to preserve a robust law of products liability in the
United States by pushing it back toward negligence law, this does not undercut our first
point: it matters whether one has a tenable view of what MacPherson stands for.
CONCLUSION
Standard accounts of MacPherson’s virtues fail, for they are based on myths: the myth
that Cardozo rejected relational duty in favor of a simple duty to the public at large; the myth
that he hid an instrumental policy argument beneath the verbiage of common law decisionmaking; and the myth that he endorsed an avowedly instrumental conception of negligence
that pointed directly to a comparably instrumental conception of strict products liability. The
myths are not themselves harmful. The problem is what they hide: that relational duty fits
into the modern world and is essential to a progressive negligence law; how moral and
pragmatic thinking fit within common law reasoning; and that—even though negligence can
and does move with the times—the strict products liability envisioned by the likes of
Traynor in the 1960s and 1970s was its own, special progressive idea. The Legal Realism at
the root of the myths of MacPherson is not so much pernicious as it is shallow. The
application of the methods of common law legal reasoning to torts cases is not a charade but
a challenge. One hundred years after MacPherson v. Buick, there is still plenty we can learn
from Judge Cardozo about how that challenge is best met.
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